THE NEXT Nato summit, to be held in Warsaw in July 2016, may be the alliance’s fourth in a row without adding new members. Assuming the days of enlargement are over would be a mistake, writes World Review expert Luke Coffey.
The ‘open door’ policy is critical to mobilising Europe and its allies around a collective transatlantic defence. According to Article 10 of the Washington treaty, any European state that fulfils the requirements of the treaty, and demonstrates the competency to contribute to the alliance’s security, is eligible for membership. Contrary to popular belief, there is nothing in Article 10 that prohibits a country from joining Nato if there is an outstanding border dispute with another state.
The benefits of Nato enlargement go well beyond the issue of security. The previous wave of expansion into Central and Eastern Europe after the Cold War showed that the political stability brought by belonging to Nato also creates a more favourable business and investment environment.
Currently, there are four official candidates wishing to join the alliance: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Georgia. Other countries, such as Kosovo and Ukraine, aspire to membership. Although Ukraine was promised eventual entry at the Bucharest summit in 2008, there is no realistic prospect of this happening soon.
Serbia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia maintain low-level relationships with Nato, but are not actively seeking membership. In response to Russia’s increasingly bellicose behaviour in the Baltic Sea region, public opinion in Finland and Sweden has become more receptive to the idea of someday becoming a part of Nato. There is also a big question mark about the future of Greece, whose debt crisis has produced a political tilt towards pro-Russian, leftist parties.
Among the Balkan countries, Montenegro and Macedonia are the closest to Nato membership. Macedonia met all the requirements for Nato admission in 2008 and anticipated an invitation that year. Yet its accession was unilaterally vetoed by Greece, which is engaged in a long-standing dispute with Skopje regarding the country’s constitutional name.
Montenegro has made steady progress towards Nato membership and it was considered a disappointment when the alliance failed to send an invitation at the 2014 summit in Wales. The government in Podgorica walks a fine line between keeping its close ties with Russia and strengthening its bond with the West. There are signs that public opinion is losing patience after last year’s rebuff at the Newport summit.
Bosnia and Herzegovina has many hurdles to overcome before joining Nato. The country must make substantial improvements to its armed forces and malfunctioning federal system before it can be invited to join the alliance.
The only country in the South Caucasus that can realistically aspire to join Nato is Georgia. Armenia is too closely aligned with Russia, while Azerbaijan prefers to remain outside collective security arrangements in a region whose oil and gas pipelines make it a vital energy corridor for Europe.
Georgia was among the countries that were promised eventual Nato membership at the Bucharest summit in 2008. A Russian invasion and occupation of 20 per cent of the country’s territory followed shortly after. Since then, some Nato members have been far from supportive of Georgia’s candidacy – especially those enjoying close relationships with Moscow.
Three of the five Nordic countries - Norway, Denmark and Iceland - are already in Nato, but Sweden and Finland are not. Sweden has maintained its neutral status since the 19th century, but there is increasing concern that the country’s declining military capability no longer guarantees adequate self-defence.
Finland's new centre-right coalition has included the option of applying for Nato membership ‘at any time’ in its official position statement, showing how opinion in that country, a determined neutral since World War II, is also shifting.
Greece has become uncomfortably close to Russia. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has back-pedaled from an earlier call by his Syriza party to withdraw from Nato and close foreign bases. Nevertheless, there is concern that the Greek government’s Russian connection could potentially disrupt the alliance, which makes all major decisions on the basis of unanimity.
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Publication Date:
Mon, 2015-08-03 05:00
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