How state behaviour is moulded by geostrategic concerns

THE ANNEXATION of Crimea in March 2014 is now considered to be a watershed event in post-Cold War world geopolitics, writes World Review contributor Ajay Cherian, student of International Affairs at O.P Jindal Global University, Sonepat, India. Mother Russia has shown that it still cares for its children and will do anything in its power to 'protect' it from the 'evil influence' that spreads from the West. Placing the region into the Russian Federation demonstrates that great powers (or even 'wannabe' great powers) - other than the United States - are progressively more successful when they are increasingly assertive over territorial disputes, projecting power beyond their immediate borders, interfering in the domestic politics of sovereign states, and, according to international leaders, breaking international law . The West’s attempt to broaden the ambit of the Nato and the EU by adding Georgia and Ukraine goes against the wishes of Russian President Vladimir Putin, who wishes to maintain his sphere of influence. The annexation of Crimea is the perfect example of state behaviour – especially that of great powers – being moulded by geostrategic concerns. It is clear that realist logic of the Cold War era has still not left the scene. This view of an international system being seen as an inherently anarchic structure, where states can only depend on themselves for their security, still dominates elite thinking. This in turn shapes state behaviour and reinforces the anarchic international system as envisaged by US political scientist and international relations scholar, Kenneth Waltz. The Crimean affair also shows that international interventions are based, in the main, on strategic calculations and rarely on moral grounds. When Russia intervened, its leaders stated that it had done so because of the 'threat' faced by Crimea’s Russian population. It was, more importantly, a signal to the West to stop meddling in what it still sees as Soviet Russian territory. While the West blames Russian actions, the United States and its European allies also played their role in the events, with many believing that they were involved in ousting the former Ukraine president, the pro-Russian, yet democratically elected Viktor Yanukovych. If emerging powers such as China and India act on rational cost-benefit calculations based on 'national interests' (violating international agreements along the way), then surely Russia, among others, can be blamed for setting a bad example? Putin has moved his pawns to keep Ukraine weak; he has fomented separatist movements in south-eastern Ukraine by arming rebels. International bodies such as the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have failed to agree on a negotiated settlement, which I believe led to such man-made disasters as the downing of Malaysian Airline’s MH17. The Boeing 777 was shot down over rebel territory on July 17, 2014, killing 283 passengers and 15 crew members who were flying between Amsterdam and Kuala Lumpur. The West’s response to Crimean annexation was sanctions. This has, however, backfired, as Europe grapples to fill the vacuum left in energy supplies that come out of Russia, while Russia itself has found demand for its exports in industrially booming Asia, albeit at a much lower price. Is it any wonder that Germany, whose burgeoning economy is heavily dependent on Russia, has been the most reluctant to go through with tougher sanctions? So, are international sanctions effective? Are they worth it? As the events in Crimea have borne out, we have seen that sanctions can hurt players on both sides of the court when we are in a tightly-knit global economic framework. While the unipolar world system of the post-Cold War period slowly erodes, the realist assumptions among the inherently anarchical world structure live on. State behaviour is shaped to a great extent by realist logic but this leads to violations of international law. This feeds mutual suspicion among states and further enforces the perception that states essentially pursue relative gains over absolute gains. As a result, mechanisms for state cooperation in international organisations fail and the anarchic structure of the international system is reinforced.

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