Energy is key factor in new Mediterranean alliance

THE geopolitical situation in the Eastern Mediterranean has become more complex since 2008 amid a series of conflicts and new alliances. Relations between Israel and Turkey have become greatly strained. In a classic example of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, Israel, Cyprus and, by extension, Greece, came together in an alliance which turned primarily not against Turkey, but against the past and their own historical tradition. Unlike Turkey, Greece recognised the state of Israel in late 1949, but this was only de facto. Greece-Israel relations remained distant during the Cold War period, in contrast to those between Israel and Turkey. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of a new balance of power in the Middle East, the new right-wing Greek government decided to recognise Israel legally as well. Relations between Israel and Cyprus, with its ethnic Greek majority, unfolded differently. Israel considered the island highly important because of its geographical proximity and because it viewed the republic as an integral part of its ‘peripheral policy’ aimed at breaking its isolation from the Arab states. Unlike Greece, Cyprus did not yield to pressure from the Arab countries and established full and formal diplomatic relations with Israel. While these developments in the 1990s offered a new start for relations between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, trilateral affairs were hampered by Israel's close ties with Turkey. Only after Turkish-Israeli relations became strained could the foundations of a new affiliation covering cooperation on economics, energy and defence be established. Greece’s determination for closer ties was demonstrated in December 2010 when Israel suffered devastating wildfires which left more than 40 people dead and required several thousand to be evacuated. Greece organised a four-day rescue operation involving 70 crew members, pilots and firefighters, and several planes. On the Cyprus-Israel side of the triangle, the economic benefit expected from huge natural gas and oil reserves has also contributed to the emergence of the trilateral alliance, since the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone borders Israel’s Leviathan Block in the Eastern Mediterranean. The total natural gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean basin is estimated at 120-150 trillion cubic feet, when the two nations’ exclusive economic zones are combined. Since European demand for the relatively cleaner power of natural gas will remain high, the Cypriot energy deposits will contribute to the EU being energy-independent from Russia, fulfilling America's decades-long goal to prevent Russia from using its natural gas exports as a means of projecting economic and political influence on the continent. Given Turkey’s unpredictable relations with Israel, as well as the continuing instability in Egypt, Israel’s only politically safe and culturally friendly passage to the West is through Greece. Moreover, any pipeline distributing natural gas to Europe from the eastern Mediterranean would have to pass through Cyprus and Greece. However, Ankara would view a possible export route to European markets through the Mediterranean, connecting Israel, Cyprus and Greece, as a threat to its own ambitions to become the major non-Russian transit route for gas sales. With Greece struggling to avoid bankruptcy, economic reforms and political/social stability are more essential than hasty diplomatic movements with Ankara or Russia. As Athens remains dependent on EU economic assistance, it has no alternative to its Western orientation. Short of such a scenario, the Greek, Cyprus, Israel trilateral alliance is likely to grow in its strategic importance for the region. Israel, on the other hand, will avoid disrupting its relations with Russia and will not exclude it from the ‘energy game’ in the region. In February 2013 a subsidiary of Russia’s Gazprom signed an exclusive 20-year deal to purchase liquefied natural gas from Israel's Tamar field.

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